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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATF (II"" UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEFFREY A. HEIL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20020738-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
I H N I M I l l III III'"! I N "i .MM PI \ IHItl> OF P R O C E E D I N G S 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, a second degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF RE V IE\ \ • 
I. Does the invited error doctrine preclude defendant's claim that the 
trial court plainly erred in admitting Dr. Delcore's letter where defense 
counsel strategically stipulated to its admission? 
No standard of review applies to this claim. 
II. Do defendant's ineffective assistance claims fail where counsel 
reasonably relied on defendant's inaccurate description of Dr. 
Delcore's testimony in waiting until near trial to contact the doctor, 
and admission of Dr. Delcore's letter was less harmful to defendant 
than live testimony would have been? 
An ineffective assistance claim preserved below "presents . . . a mixed question of 
law and fact." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah App. 1997). This Court 
"defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact, but review[s] its legal conclusions for 
correctness." Id. 
III. Does defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim fail where the 
prosecutor revealed the source of Dr. Delcore's letter before it was 
admitted? 
"'Because a trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact 
on the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's [ruling] on prosecutorial 
misconduct absent an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 10, 69 P.3d 
1278 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998)). "'This standard is met 
only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant.'" Id. 
(quoting Harmon, 956 P.2d at 276) (internal quotation marks and additional citations 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are necessary to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 10, 2001, defendant was charged with aggravated assault, a second 
degree felony. R. 1-2. After a two-day jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged. R. 
87-88. Defendant's sentence of one-to-fifteen years in prison and his $10,000 fine were 
suspended, and defendant was ordered to serve 120 days in jail and thirty-six months 
probation. R. 157-59, 162-66. 
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Defendant moved for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and 
prosecutorial misconduct. R. 170-82. After a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's 
motion. R. 253-61. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 282. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Only Fred Orton and defendant really know what transpired between them on 
August 25, 2002. R. 314:57. However, Orton's severe injuries make up for the 
deficiency in witnesses. 
A History of Conflict 
Fred Orton and defendant had a history of conflicts, centering around Orton's 
cows trespassing on defendant's hay field. R. 314:39, 93, 230. Defendant had a 
judgement against Orton for livestock trespass and often threatened Orton when he found 
Orton's cattle on his property. R. 314:291. Defendant would also run along his fence 
while Orton was herding his cattle up and down the adjacent county road, telling Orton he 
would "kick [his] ass" and warning Orton that "those damned livestock better not get on 
[my] place." R. 314:284. During one of those confrontations, defendant told Orton that 
he was a professional boxer and that he'd beat Orton to death. R. 314:38, 238. 
1
 Except as otherwise indicated, the facts of the crime are recited in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f 2, 6 P.3d 1116. 
3 
"I told you Vd kill you, you son-of-a-bitch your cows got in my hay again,... 
I'll beat you to death." 
On August 25, 2002, Orton learned from a neighbor that some of Orton's cows 
were coming in off the open range toward his fields that bordered defendant's property. 
R. 314:29. Orton drove north along the county road next to defendant's property and 
rounded up his cattle. Id. When Orton arrived at defendant's gate along the road, his 
cows were on the road "stringing" toward his own property. R. 314:29, 38. Orton 
stopped to shut defendant's gate so that his cattle would not enter defendant's land. R. 
314:30. As he was tending to one side of the gate, Orton heard a Jeep pull up behind him. 
R. 314:31-32. 
Before Orton turned around to see who was in the Jeep, defendant "football 
tackled [him] from behind." Id. Defendant then grabbed Orton's hair and collar. Id. 
Orton looked to see who had attacked him, but all he could see were the ends of 
someone's fingers and a rock, which hit him in the eye so he couldn't see. Id. Defendant 
then got on top of Orton and punched Orton some seven times with his right fist. R. 
314:75, 82, 236. Before he went unconscious, Orton felt his jaw break. R. 314:32. 
When Orton awoke, defendant was kicking him in the ribs and head. Id. As Orton 
crawled toward his truck, defendant kicked him one more time "for all the cows he's 
starved." R. 314:33, 243. When Orton got into his truck, defendant was still standing in 
the gateway, screaming "I told you I'd kill you, you son-of-a-bitch your cows got in my 
4 
hay again,.. . I'll beat you to death." R. 314:33. Defendant was "in a rage" and threw 
Orton's sunglasses and hat at him. R. 314:34. 
The attack took place about five or six feet from defendant's gate on his property. 
R. 314:77. 
Orton's Injuries 
Orton's injuries were extensive. R. 314:67. Orton had significant bruising on his 
face, and his jaw was fractured on both sides. R. 314:70-71, 177. Orton's right eye was 
severely swollen, and he had bruising on his upper chest. R.314:184. 
The fracture to Orton's left side of his jaw was not treatable; it had to heal on its 
own. R. 314:178. Orton had surgery to repair the right side of his jaw. R. 314:178, 36. 
He then required dentures because his teeth fit together differently after the attack. R. 
314:178. 
Dr. Pearson, who treated Orton after the incident, confirmed that most of Orton's 
injuries were consistent with being struck on the face with a fist. R. 314:186, 190, 194-
95. The jaw fractures, however, were more consistent with a blow from a small object 
which allowed the force to be concentrated or from a very powerful punch. R. 314:186, 
190, 194-95. 
After the attack, Orton needed assistance running his farm for quite some time. R. 
314:36. Orton could not ride a horse and had severe headaches for several months. R. 
314:35-36. According to his doctor, Orton likely will never regain full jaw mobility, and 
he may still get headaches from the pain in his jaw. R. 314:179. 
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Defendant had some minor bruising on his left shoulder. R. 314:132. He also had 
bruises on his knuckles as well as a scaphoid fracture in his right hand, most likely caused 
by defendant's hitting Orton with his fist. R. 314:95, 238, 303. 
Orton was not defendant's only victim 
William Larson used to be one of defendant's neighbors. Once, when his cows got 
onto defendant's property, defendant started screaming at him and threatened to "beat the 
shit out of him." R.314:265-66. After defendant's wife warned Larson not to get out of 
his car, defendant attacked Larson's car, hitting the window several times and kicking the 
vehicle. Id. According to Larson, he did nothing to provoke defendant, but merely came 
to retrieve his cows. Id. Larson concluded, "I was so afraid that I quit raising any kind of 
animals on that properly. I just backed off and got away from there." R. 314:267. 
Dennis Gaede used to work for defendant as a truck driver. R. 314:270. When 
Gaede told defendant he was quitting, defendant threatened to "kick [his] butt." Id. 
Gaede remembered that defendant had similarly lost his temper in other situations "at the 
drop of a hat." R. 314:272, 274. According to Gaede, defendant bragged about fights he 
had won in California and about his hands being weapons. R. 314:273-74. Gaede's wife 
recalled that defendant admitted he was hot-headed, that he had been in some fights, and 
that his "hands were registered weapons." R. 314:280-81 
Detective Drishinski, the investigating officer, testified that defendant is a boxer 
and "could do serious damage with his hands." R.314:75. 
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Defendantfs story 
Defendant admitted that he had training in boxing and martial arts. R.314:240. 
He testified, however, that he has never threatened or fought anyone else in Iron County. 
R. 314:257. He is "a lover, not a fighter." R. 314:241. 
Defendant testified that he had already shooed Orton's cattle off his land when he 
met Orton that day. R. 314:229. He then saw Orton's cattle approaching one of his gates. 
R. 314:230. Defendant decided to close the gate to keep Orton's cows off his property. 
R. 314:231. 
Defendant was in the process of closing the gate when Orton arrived. R. 314:231, 
233. When Orton stopped, defendant confronted him concerning his cows. R. 314:233. 
Defendant told Orton "that [he] had absolutely had it" and that he was going to report 
Orton to the authorities. Id. "I was tired of him starving his animals and I was going to 
put a stop to it. I said, when I'm done with you you'll never be able to starve another 
animal again, I've had it. And I said, I'm going to solve this problem once and for all." 
Id 
Defendant claimed, however, that he did not threaten Orton physically in any way. 
Id. Rather, Orton got out of his truck and came at defendant with a 12-inch crescent 
wrench, saying "if you want to solve this problem, let's solve it right now." R. 314:93, 
233-34. 
Defendant claimed he parried the wrench and then hit Orton only in self-defense 
and only until Orton stopped "coming at me." R. 314:235, 237-41, 246-48, 257. 
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Defendant admitted, however, that he did kick Orton "in the butt [as Orton was returning 
to his t ruck] . . . for all the cows he's starved." R. 314:243. Defendant explained, 
"[0]nce I kicked him in the butt , . . . I allowed him to grab his hat and his crescent 
wrench, and I allowed him to get back to his truck." R. 314:256. 
The day after the attack, defendant learned that he had a scaphoid fracture in his 
right hand. R. 314:238. He was treated by Dr. Delcore, who put a cast on his arm and 
was "insistent" that defendant take work off until the fracture healed. R. 314:242. 
At trial, defendant called Scott Holyoke, who testified that he and Orton had had 
confrontations before concerning Orton's livestock. R. 314:210. During one of those 
confrontations, the two got into a fight. R. 314:211. Orton threw the first punch. R. 
314:212. 
Kenny Rossberg, a former friend of Orton's, recalled once on a trip when Orton 
got mad at Rossberg's horse and got a gun to shoot it. R. 314:219-21. Rossberg was 
surprised by how quickly Orton got mad. R. 314:220-21. 
Finally, defendant testified that William Larson was "inaccurate" when he testified 
that defendant had threatened him. R. 314:291. In addition, defendant had a judgment 
against him for livestock trespass. Id, Defendant described Dennis Gaede as a reckless 
employee who blew up three motors while working for him. R. 314:292. Moreover, 
Gaede told defendant he was quitting on a Friday and wouldn't be driving anymore, even 
though defendant needed him the following Monday. R. 314:293. 
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Dr. Delcore's Testimony 
Dr. Delcore treated defendant's scaphoid fracture after the attack. R. 314:173, 
239, 242, 303. In his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that "Mr. Heil 
defended himself and as a result his wrist was fractured. And his doctor will testify about 
that fracture and tell you what he thinks caused it." R. 314:27. 
However, although subpoenaed by defendant, Dr. Delcore called the trial court 
after the first day of trial to explain that he had been served with a subpoena the day 
before but was not able to testify at defendant's trial because of scheduled surgeries. R. 
314:172-73 (attached at Addendum A). He then summarized for the court what his 
testimony would have been had he been able to appear. Id. He stated he would testify 
that defendant's scaphoid fracture was caused by the wrist being bent backwards. Id. 
Although a scaphoid fracture could be caused by being hit by something, it was much 
more likely caused by either falling down or throwing a punch. Id. 
The trial court wrote down the doctor's proffer and then told him to go to the 
surgeries, that he would be contacted between surgeries to verify that the court's summary 
of his testimony was accurate. R. 314:173. 
When the court disclosed this contact to counsel the next morning, defense counsel 
indicated he had served the subpoena on the doctor on Tuesday for a Friday appearance. 
R. 314:173. Counsel explained that the late notice was because, before then, he was not 
sure who defendant's witnesses were going to be. Id. Counsel further explained that 
defendant had talked with Dr. Delcore before trial. R. 314:173-74. In addition, counsel 
9 
"made efforts to talk to Dr. Delcore myself," including leaving a phone message for him 
with "my home phone number and my office phone number." Id. 
The court noted, "I don't know if you even[] want him. I mean, if that's what his 
testimony is going to be it's more helpful to the prosecution than to the defense." R. 
314:174. Defense counsel asked for an opportunity to discuss the matter with the 
prosecutor. Id. 
During a subsequent break in testimony, the court contacted Dr. Delcore in 
chambers to verify its account of his testimony. R. 314:295-303 (attached at Addendum 
B). Both the prosecutor and defense counsel were present during the call and were 
allowed to ask the doctor questions. R. 314:295-300. Dr. Delcore again stated that 
defendant's injury was most likely caused by "a fall on an outstretched hand or . . . 
jerking the wrist back forcibly" and that it "is extremely unlikely if not almost impossible 
to . . . fracture a scaphoid with a concussion or a contusion mechanism injury." 
R.314:296. Thus, although defendant suggested "he may have sustained the injury from 
being struck . . . by a . . . monkey wrench," the likelihood of a wrench hitting the wrist 
and causing this kind of fracture was extremely low. R. 314:296-297. Moreover, if a 
wrench caused the injury, one would expect to see a contusion or laceration on the wrist. 
R. 314:299-300. None was seen here. Id. 
After questioning, counsel and the court went off the record. R. 314:300. When 
the record resumed, the court asked, "[h]ow do you want to address what we just 
resolved? One of you read it, just publish it, have the clerk read it, or what?" R. 314:300. 
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The State suggested that the clerk read the statement and then provide it to the jury during 
deliberations. R.314:300-301. Defense counsel said, "[t]hat's fine." R. 314:301. 
When proceedings continued, the trial court explained that Dr. Delcore's 
"testimony is going to be submitted by agreement of both sides by way of a letter." R. 
314:302. The court continued, "The two attorneys and I have met by speaker phone with 
Dr. Delcore just briefly a few minutes ago, and based on his conversation the agreement 
was reached to read this letter of his. It is not signed. You'll be given a copy of it. But 
it's . . . his position." R.314:302-303. 
The clerk then read the following statement into the record: 
My name is Randy G. Delcore. I am an orthopaedic surgeon and on 
or about August 26, 2001,1 treated Jeffrey Heil for an injury to his 
right scaphoid (wrist/hand region of the body). 
Mr. Heil reported to me that he received this injury by being struck 
with a wrench by another person. While this scenario is possible (I 
suppose in this life anything is possible) in my opinion the injury is 
consistent with Mr. Heil striking another person with his right hand, 
causing the wrist (hand) to rotate backward and thus causing the 
injury . . . . not blunt force trauma from a wrench or other instrument. 
And that there was no laceration or bruising on the wrist. 
I apologize that I cannot be present in Court today, but I did not 
receive a Subpoena until Wednesday, May 1, 2002, therein 
requesting my appearance on Friday, May 3, 2002. On this date, 
Friday, May 3, 2002,1 am performing seven (7) surgeries beginning 
at 6:30 A.M., and I do not anticipate completing my work until 4:00 
P.M. or 4:30 P.M. at the earliest. 
R.314:303; Exh. 18 (emphasis indicates sentence hand-written by court). 
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After the letter was read, the prosecutor moved that the letter be admitted as 
evidence. R. 314:304. The trial court stated, "And that's received by stipulation." Id. 
Defense counsel did not object. Id. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor noted that defendant had testified "in his own 
statement that Mr. Orton came at him with a wrench and he used his wrist to swipe away 
the wrench and, and that's what caused the break." R. 314:324. The prosecutor then 
noted, "Well, if that's true he would have sustained a broken wrist before the fight even 
got started. How would he have then been able to cause the kind of force or pressure that 
. . . it would have taken to break [Orton's jaw] bone with a broken hand?" R. 314:324. 
The prosecutor also stated: 
You will have a chance to read Dr. Delcore's letter. And Dr. 
Delcore's letter, and it was read to you, but it essentially states that, 
that he had the chance to observe the defendant, that he did not 
observe any laceration or bruise on the, on the right wrist where the 
apparent injury was sustained. 
Now I ask you if, if his wrist had been hit by a wrench with 
enough force to break his wrist, would there not have been some 
kind of bruise or a laceration or some indication of an injury? I think 
that there probably would have been . . . . 
R. 314:326-27. Finally, the prosecutor argued: 
Dr. Delcore goes on to say that this type of injury is consistent 
with somebody who has punched somebody and, and causes the 
hand to go back like that. That's what this type of injury is 
consistent with. And you'll have a chance to, to look over his letter 
and, and read that. But it's not consistent with getting hit on top of 
the wrist by a wrench. 
R. 314:327. 
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In his closing argument, defense counsel noted: 
At the beginning of this trial[,] . . . I said that I was confident 
that the evidence would show that Mr. Orton's cattle were 
trespassing. That Mr. Orton himself was trespassing. That he was 
not trespassing in a friendly neighborly way, but that he in fact was 
trespassing in a threatening and menacing way, that he broke Mr. 
Heil's wrist with a cres[c]ent wrench, and that Mr. Heil fought back 
in self-defense. 
R. 314:335-36. Counsel then reviewed the differences between defendant's testimony 
and Orton's testimony. R. 314:336-42. He then noted that the photographs of defendant 
would show that defendant did suffer bruising on his left shoulder. R. 314:342. In 
addition, "You'll see the cast on his right wrist. Something happened, somehow that 
wrist got broken. And yet Mr. Orton testifies that he never struck Mr. Heil." R. 314:342. 
Then counsel argued: 
Mr. Heil was in immediate danger. Here's a man with a 
crescent wrench, could have hit him in the head. He had a right to 
defend himself and he didn't have an obligation to run away. And he 
testified that he didn't intentionally try to hurt or cause serious bodily 
injury to Mr. Orton. 
R. 314:347. 
The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated assault. R. 314:357. 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial 
After his conviction, defendant filed a motion for new trial. R. 167-82. Defendant 
claimed prosecutorial misconduct for the State's failure to disclose that Scott Burns, 
former county attorney and close friend to Dr. Delcore, was the actual author of Dr. 
Delcore's letter. R. 167-82. Alternatively, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel 
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for trial counsel's failure to secure Dr. Delcore's presence at trial and his failure to object 
to the letter's admission. R. 167-82. After hearing argument, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion. R. 314:429 (transcript attached at Addendum C). 
Concerning defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim, the court found that the 
prosecutor had disclosed the origin of Dr. Delcore's letter to both the court and defense 
counsel prior to its admission. R. 258-60 (Order Denying Defendant's Motion for New 
Trial, attached at Addendum D). Moreover, 
the significant point is whether that proffered testimony is stipulated 
to and both sides agree that the proffered testimony be submitted to 
the jury. It doesn't matter who wrote it or who stated it as long as 
the words have been agreed to by both sides. And they were in this 
case. 
R. 314:429; R. 258-59. 
Concerning defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court noted 
that counsel "did the best he could with the facts that he had and the case that was 
presented to him by the defendant. My reading of [defense counsel] was that he was 
surprised by Dr. Delcore's testimony, that it wasn't the same as what the defendant had 
led him to believe." R. 314:429. The court also noted that, although the doctor's 
testimony helped the prosecution's case more than it did the defendant's, "what was given 
to the jury in written form was much milder, less prejudicial to the defendant" than if Dr. 
Delcore had actually testified. R. 314:430; R. 255. 
The court concluded that because defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's 
alleged deficient performance, it did not have to decide whether in fact counsel performed 
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deficiently. R. 254-56. The court noted, however, that if counsel had subpoenaed the 
doctor "a week or two earlier and Dr. Delcore had been here I think there's, that just 
increases the chances of conviction because of the reasons I've just stated. It was more 
of, his testimony was more beneficial to the prosecution than to the defense." R. 314:430. 
Defendant did not call any witnesses to testify at the motion hearing. R, 314:396-
431. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in admitting 
Dr. Delcore's letter. However, defense counsel specifically stipulated to the letter's 
admission at trial, and thus invited any error on the trial court's part. 
Issue II. Alternatively, defendant claims that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently, first, in failing to adequately investigate the doctor's testimony, and, second, 
in not objecting to admission of the doctor's letter. However, defense counsel's approach 
to Dr. Delcore was based on his understanding from defendant that the doctor's testimony 
would be favorable. Under those circumstances, counsel had no pressing need to contact 
the doctor early, and did not perform deficiently in waiting instead until just prior to trial. 
Furthermore, once counsel became aware that Dr. Delcore's testimony would not be as 
helpful as defendant had apparently indicated, counsel reasonably chose to minimize that 
testimony by stipulating to admission of the doctor's letter rather than requiring the doctor 
to testify in person. Finally, as the trial court itself noted, even if counsel did perform 
deficiently vis-a-vis the doctor, defendant was not prejudiced by that performance 
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because Dr. Delcore's live testimony would have been more damaging for defendant than 
was the doctor's letter. 
Issue III. Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial 
misconduct by presenting Dr. Delcore's letter without disclosing that the letter was 
actually written by the county prosecutor, who was a close friend of the doctor's. 
Because the trial court specifically found at defendant's motion for a new trial that the 
prosecutor had disclosed the origin of the doctor's letter prior to its admission, 
defendant's claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE PRECLUDES DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN 
ADMITTING DR. DELCORE'S LETTER WHERE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL STRATEGICALLY STIPULATED TO ITS ADMISSION 
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court's carte blanche acceptance of Dr. Delcore's 
unsigned statement into evidence" was plain error. Aplt. Br. at 12-13. Specifically, 
defendant argues that "the trial court plainly erred in allowing Dr. Delcore's statement to 
be admitted into evidence" because the statement was obviously inadmissible hearsay and 
because its admission obviously violated his right to confrontation. Aplt. Br. at 13, 19, 
24-26. This Court should not reach defendant's claim where his trial counsel led the 
court into any error by strategically stipulating to the evidence. 
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To establish plain error, defendant must show that: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
However, this Court "will decline to consider a defendant's plain-error arguments 
if the alleged errors reasonably resulted from defense counsel's 'conscious decision to 
refrain from objecting,' or if defense counsel 'led the trial court into error.'" State v. Hall, 
946 P.2d 712, 716 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 
(Utah 1989)); see also State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997); State v. Anderson, 
929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996). Thus, this Court will not consider a plain error claim 
"if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she 
had no objection . . . ." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, | 54, 70 P.3d 111. 
Here, when the trial court asked how counsel wanted to address Dr. Delcore's 
letter, and the prosecutor suggested that the clerk read it to the jury, defense counsel said 
"That's fine, your Honor." R. 314:301. In addition, defense counsel raised no objection 
when the trial court stated—several times in open court—that counsel had stipulated to 
the admission of Dr. Delcore's letter. R. 314:302 ("testimony is going to be submitted by 
agreement of both sides by way of a letter); R. 314:302-03 ("the agreement was reached 
to read this letter"); R. 314:304 ("And [the letter is] received by stipulation."); See also R. 
258-59, R. 314:429. Thus, defense counsel led the trial court into any error in admitting 
the letter. 
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Moreover, defense counsel had a sound strategic reason for his decision. Counsel 
had already told the jury that defendant's doctor would be testifying. R. 314:27. Not 
calling the doctor could cause a loss of credibility with the jury. However, much to 
counsel's surprise, Dr. Delcore's testimony was not as defendant had represented. See R. 
314:429 (court noting at hearing on motion for new trial that counsel "was surprised by 
Dr. Delcore's testimony, that it wasn't the same as what the defendant had led him to 
believe."). In fact, as the trial court noted, the testimony was "going to be . . . more 
helpful to the prosecution than to the defense." R. 314:174. 
In light of this turn of events, defense counsel had to decide which would hurt 
defendant's case less—the doctor appearing in person to give testimony favorable to the 
State or a letter briefly summarizing his testimony.2 Counsel apparently decided the 
latter. See R. 314:301. As the trial court noted during hearing on defendant's motion for 
new trial, that decision was sound. See R. 314:430 (court noting that "what was given to 
the jury in written form was much milder, less prejudicial to the defendant" than if Dr. 
Delcore had actually testified). 
Because defense counsel not only "consciously elect[ed] [not to object] as part of a 
defense strategy," but in fact "led the trial court into error" by stipulating to the letter's 
2Neither below nor on appeal has defendant claimed that admission of Dr. 
Delcore's testimony violated his physician-patient privilege. See State v. Kruger, 2000 
UT 60, <|j 21, 6 P.3d 1116 (noting reply brief "'limited to answering any new matter set 
forth in the opposing brief,'" and where "State did not raise the issue in its brief, but only 
pointed out in a footnote that Kruger had not raised the issue in the trial court or in his 
opening brief on appeal," "[t]hat observation . . . did not constitute a 'new matter' 
entitling Kruger to brief the issue in his reply brief). 
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admission, this court should not reach defendant's plain error claim. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 
158-59; see also Brown, 948 P.2d at 343; Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109; Hall, 946 P.2d at 
716. 
II. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS FAIL 
WHERE COUNSEL REASONABLY RELIED ON DEFENDANT'S 
INACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF DR. DELCORE'S TESTIMONY 
IN WAITING UNTIL NEAR TRIAL TO CONTACT THE DOCTOR, 
AND ADMISSION OF DR. DELCORE'S LETTER WAS LESS 
HARMFUL TO DEFENDANT THAN LIVE TESTIMONY WOULD 
HAVE BEEN 
Defendant claims that "defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance . . . (1) by 
failing to investigate Dr. Delcore's testimony prior to trial; and (2) by failing to timely 
object to the admission of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement at trial." Aplt. Br. at 32. 
Defendant's claims lack merit. 
"To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show, 
first, that counsel rendered a deficient performance that fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judgment, and second, that counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant." State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)). 
In considering whether counsel performed deficiently, there is "a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Villarreal, 
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857 P.2d at 954 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 19, 12 P.3d 92. Because counsel is given "wide latitude in 
making tactical decisions," courts "will not question such decisions unless there is no 
reasonable basis supporting them." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (emphasis added); see also 
State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, If 6, 496 Utah Adv. Rep. 10. "[T]his [C]ourt will not second-
guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those choices might 
appear in retrospect." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993) (citations 
omitted). 
In addition, "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not 
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on 
the judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. "Attorney errors come in an infinite variety 
and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial." 
Id. at 693. Thus, in addition to showing counsel's deficient performance, defendant must 
also demonstrate that "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
"It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 
the outcome of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Rather, defendant must 
show that, absent counsel's acts or omissions, a more favorable result is a "demonstrable 
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reality and not a speculative matter." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
A. Defense counsel's reliance on defendant's representations of how 
his doctor would testify does not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
Defendant claims that trial counsel performed deficiently because he "failed to 
contact Dr. Delcore or investigate the substance of his testimony prior to trial." Aplt. Br. 
at 35. Defendant contends that "[h]ad defense counsel timely contacted and interviewed 
Dr. Delcore . . .
 ? the record fact that Dr. Delcore was involved with the prosecution 
would have been evident" and "even if the prosecution had placed Dr. Delcore on the 
witnesses [sic] stand at trial, his bias would have been easily made clear to the jury." Id. 
at 36. Instead, "where defense counsel's one feeble attempt to telephone Dr. Delcore 
[prior to trial] constituted inadequate investigation, deficient performance is established." 
Id. at 35. Because defendant's claim is essentially that his counsel was ineffective for 
believing his representation of the doctor's testimony, defendant's claim must fail. 
[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and 
facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and 
strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, 
counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. 
In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate 
must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all circumstances, 
applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; see also Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 ("If counsel does not 
adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, including the availability of 
prospective defense witnesses, counsel's performance cannot fall within the 'wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance.5") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). 
Consequently, although the "decision not to investigate [at all] cannot be considered a 
tactical decision," Templin, 805 P.2d at 188, whether "less than complete investigation" is 
reasonable depends on whether information known to counsel "makes particular 
investigations unnecessary," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
Moreover, "[t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or 
substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 691. Indeed, "[c]ounsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed 
strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant." 
Id. "In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such 
information." Id. Therefore, "inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant 
may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may 
be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decisions." Id. 
Finally, the fact that counsel waits to contact witnesses until just before trial "in 
and of itself raises no inference of deficient performance." Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 
277, 285 (Utah 1995) (rejecting claim that counsel performed deficiently in "wait[ing] 
until after the guilt phase to begin preparing for the penalty phase" in death penalty case). 
Our courts have "decline[d] to determine what amount of time counsel must spend . . . to 
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ensure that the representation does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Clearly, the time period will vary with every case." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 526 
(Utah 1994). Thus, "each situation must be judged upon its own circumstances and in 
light of its own degree of complexity." Jividen v. State, 569 S.E.2d 589, 591 (Ga. App. 
2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, defendant bases his claim on the following facts: Defendant was treated by 
Dr. Delcore on August 26, 2001, see Aplt. Br. at 33 (citing R. 314:303); trial counsel 
appeared in the case two weeks later, see id. (citing R. 3-5); trial counsel was aware of 
Dr. Delcore as a potential witness, see Aplt. Br. at 33-34 (citing R. 314:173); counsel 
nonetheless did not serve the doctor with a subpoena until April 30, 2002, three days 
before trial, see Aplt. Br. at 34 (citing R. 314:73); Dr. Delcore "[apparently . . . did not 
receive the subpoena until the day before trial," or two days before he was supposed to 
testify, id. (citing R. 314:172-73); and "the only effort specified [on the record concerning 
counsel's attempt to contact the doctor] was a telephone message left for Dr. Delcore just 
prior to trial," id. at 34 (citing R. 314:173-74). 
These facts, when viewed in light of the record as a whole, are inadequate to 
support defendant's claim. First, although defense counsel indicated at trial that he 
"made efforts to talk to Dr. Delcore," R. 314:173, the record is silent as to when or how 
often counsel made those efforts. Defendant contends counsel's reference reflects only 
"one feeble attempt to telephone Dr. Delcore." Aplt. Br. at 35. However, nothing in the 
record mandates that conclusion. Indeed, because counsel's statement that he "made 
23 
efforts" is ambiguous as to when and how often counsel attempted to contact the doctor, 
that ambiguity must be "construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 17; see also State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, 
t65 ,57P.3dl l39 . 3 
Second, even if counsel did wait until just before trial to contact the doctor, that 
fact alone does not establish deficient performance. Cf. Taylor, 905 P.2d at 285; Parsons, 
871 P.2d at 526. Rather, this Court must consider whether counsel's decision was 
reasonable under the circumstances. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (noting that 
"strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to 
the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation" 
and that "inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may be critical to a 
proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions"). 
The record concerning what defense counsel knew about Dr. Delcore's potential 
testimony before trial establishes that counsel acted reasonably under the circumstances. 
3
"[W]here, on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective . . . , defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate." State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 16, 12 P.3d 92. "The necessary consequence of this burden is 
that an appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is 
supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware." Id. at If 17. "Where 
the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting 
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively." Id. ; see also State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, ^  65, 57 P.3d 1139. Here, 
defendant could have developed a record either at the hearing on his motion for new trial 
or through a successful motion for a rule 23B remand. Instead, defendant presented no 
evidence at the hearing on his motion for new trial, see R. 314:396-432, and alleged 
insufficient facts in his motion for a rule 23B remand, see Court of Appeals Order dated 
Nov. 17,2003. 
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The record indicates that defendant talked to Dr. Delcore before trial. R. 314:173-74. 
Although defense counsel "made efforts" to contact the doctor before trial himself, his 
efforts were unsuccessful. R. 314:173-74. Nonetheless, defense counsel referenced Dr. 
Delcore's testimony in his opening statement. R. 314:27. Because the presumption of 
effective assistance requires that all record ambiguities and gaps be construed against 
defendant's claim, see Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 16, this Court must presume that 
defendant told his counsel that the doctor's testimony would be as defense counsel 
represented it to the jury in opening. This presumption, which defendant has not rebutted, 
is consistent with the trial court's comment at the hearing on defendant's motion for new 
trial that defense counsel was apparently misled by defendant concerning the nature of the 
doctor's testimony. R. 314:429.4 
Because counsel presumably believed defendant's representation that the doctor's 
testimony would be entirely helpful to defendant, counsel had no reason to anticipate the 
need for impeachment evidence. Thus, counsel had no pressing need to contact the 
doctor earlier than he did. See Aplt. Br. at 36 (suggesting that early contact of doctor 
would have revealed "that Dr. Delcore was involved with the prosecution" and would 
have provided counsel with information through which the doctor's "bias would have 
been easily made clear to the jury"). "It is not defense counsel's fault that defendant lied 
to him." People v. Burnett, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 120, 135 (Ct. App., Sixth Dist. 2003). 
4See footnote 2 supra. 
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Consequently, counsel's decision not to contact the doctor earlier than he did does 
not constitute deficient performance. 
B. Defense counsel's stipulation to Dr. Delcore's letter after 
realizing that defendant had misrepresented the doctor's 
testimony does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, 
where the trial court itself noted that the letter would be less 
prejudicial to defendant than the doctor's live testimony. 
Defendant claims that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the 
admission of Dr. Delcore's letter. See Aplt. Br. at 36-38. Defendant claims that "[a] 
timely objection" to the evidence as inadmissible hearsay or as violating defendant's 
constitutional rights to confrontation "would have precluded Dr. Delcore's hearsay 
statement from admission into evidence and from being published to the jury." Id. at 37. 
"At the very least, a timely objection would have forced the State to request a continuance 
to present Dr. Delcore's testimony on a later date, allowing defense counsel time to 
prepare effective cross-examination." Id. at 37-38. 
As previously discussed, defense counsel had a sound strategic reason for 
stipulating to Dr. Delcore's letter. Counsel had already told the jury that defendant's 
doctor would be testifying. R. 314:27. Not calling the doctor could cause a loss of 
credibility with the jury. However, when, much to his surprise, Dr. Delcore's testimony 
was not as defendant represented, see R. 314:429, defense counsel had to decide which 
would hurt defendant's case less—the doctor actually appearing to give testimony 
favorable to the State and then defendant attempting to undermine that testimony, or a 
letter briefly summarizing the doctor's testimony. Counsel's decision in favor of the 
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latter was sound. See R. 314:430 (court noting that "what was given to the jury in written 
form was much milder, less prejudicial to the defendant" than if Dr. Delcore had actually 
testified). 
Thus, defense counsel did not act deficiently in not objecting to Dr. Delcore's 
letter. 
C. Even if counsel's performance was deficient, defendant cannot 
show prejudice where the doctor's testimony was not 
inconsistent with his defense 
Even if this Court concludes that defense counsel did perform deficiently, 
defendant cannot show that he suffered prejudiced. 
Defendant claims that counsel's performance prejudiced him because, "[h]ad 
defense counsel adequately investigated Dr. Delcore's testimony and properly objected to 
the admission of his hearsay statement, defense counsel would have been able to procure 
Mr. Heil's constitutional right to confrontation, and expose Dr. Delcore's biases." Aplt. 
Br. at 39. In addition, he argues, defendant was prejudiced because, "[d]uring his 
opening statement at tr[ia]l, after explaining that Mr. Heil was acting in self defense and 
was injured in that effort while being attacked by Mr. Orton, defense counsel informed 
the jury that Dr. Delcore . . . would testify about what caused Mr. Heil's injury." Id. 
"However, instead of favorable evidence, the jury received Dr. Delcore's damaging 
hearsay statement." Id. Finally, defendant urges, he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
performance because, "until Dr. Delcore's expert opinion was offered to the jury, the 
evidence favored acquittal." Aplt. Br. at 26, 28. Defendant's arguments lack merit. 
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To show prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test, defendant "bears 
the burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that he would not have been 
convicted absent his counsel's [deficient performance]." State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 
439, 441 (Utah 1996). Thus, defendant must "proffer[]. . . record evidence which 
undermines [this Court's] confidence in his verdict." Id Defendant has not made that 
showing here. 
Although defendant claims he would have challenged Dr. Delcore on cross-
examination concerning his friendship with then county attorney Scott Burns, see Aplt. 
Br. at 36, 39, nowhere does defendant proffer what Dr. Delcore's testimony would have 
been in response to that cross-examination. Thus, he "urges this court to assess the 
probable impact of testimony without placing before [this Court] the substance of that 
testimony." Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441. "This invitation to speculate cannot substitute 
for proof of prejudice." Id. 
Morover, "[m]aking promises about the defense evidence in opening statement and 
then failing to deliver does not constitute ineffective assistance per se." People v. 
Burnett, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 120, 135 (Ct. App., Sixth Dist. 2003). Here, the record shows that 
defense counsel tried to contact the doctor before trial but was unsuccessful. R. 314:173-
74. Having not yet spoken to the doctor, counsel apparently relied on defendant's 
summary of what Dr. Delcore's testimony would be to reference that testimony during his 
opening statement. R. 314:429. "It is not defense counsel's fault that defendant lied to 
him. Nor is it counsel's fault that he told the jury that he would present evidence which, 
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apparently during the course of the trial, he discovered was a lie." Burnett, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 
at 134. 
Counsel could have, as defendant suggests, objected to the letter and thereby 
"procurefd] Mr. Heil's constitutional right to confrontation, and expose[d] Dr. Delcore's 
biases." Aplt. Br. at 39. However, live testimony is less predictable than written 
testimony; in addition, the doctor's conclusions might be subject to greater repetition and 
more exacting explanations during live testimony, both of which could have more greatly 
undermined defendant's defense. Moreover, to have the doctor appear and then to 
strenuously cross-examine him after counsel's opening statement referenced Dr. Delcore 
favorably could have substantially undermined the defense's credibility. 
In any case, contrary to defendant's claim, see Aplt. Br. at 29, 41, Dr. Delcore's 
letter was not inconsistent with defendant's defense. Although defendant intimated that 
he might have fractured his wrist in blocking the wrench, he also testified that he really 
wasn't sure whether he was ever even hit by the wrench. R. 314:247-48. Furthermore, 
defendant admitted to punching Orton several times in self-defense, see R. 314:235, 240-
41, 257, which was perfectly consistent with the doctor's testimony that a punch is what 
caused defendant's fracture. Thus, although the doctor's letter may not have supported 
defendant's defense perfectly, it did not, as defendant now claims, "cast[] substantial 
doubt on Mr. Heil's self-defense theory of his case" or "gravely undermine[] his 
credibility." Aplt. Br. at 29. 
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Finally, contrary to defendant's claim, the evidence before Dr. Delcore's letter— 
as highlighted by the discrepancy in injuries between defendant and Fred Orton combined 
with defendant's own testimony—did not "favor[] acquittal." Aplt. Br. at 26. Orton had 
significant bruising on his face, his right eye was severely swollen, he had bruising on his 
upper chest, and his jaw was fractured on both sides. R. 314:70-71, 177, 184. Defendant 
admitted causing those injuries. R. 314:240, 250, 255, 259. Yet, despite his claim that he 
was only defending himself against Orton's attacks, defendant's only injury from Orton 
was some minor bruising to his chest/shoulder area. R. 314:98, 132. The lacerations on 
his wrist and his broken wrist were apparently caused, not by Orton, but by defendant's 
own punches. R. 314:303.5 Lastly, and perhaps most damning, was defendant's 
admission that, after he had bruised Orton's eye and broken his jaw in two places, 
defendant kicked Orton "in the butt" as Orton struggled to get to his truck. R. 314:96, 
247, 256. Then, "once I kicked him in the butt , . . . I allowed him to grab his hat and his 
crescent wrench, and I allowed him to get back to his truck." R. 314:256 (emphasis 
added). Such aggressive and merciless conduct—reflecting as it does defendant's 
awareness that he was in control of the situation—is not consistent with defendant's claim 
that he was acting only in self-defense. 
5Although defendant claims his counsel was ineffective vis-a-vis Dr. Delcore, 
defendant does not contend that Dr. Delcore's testimony would never have been admitted 
had his counsel objected to Dr. Delcore's letter. Rather, defendant acknowledges that the 
State may very well have called the doctor to testify in person. See Aplt. Br. at 36, 39. 
Thus, Dr. Delcore's evidence regarding the cause of defendant's broken wrist would have 
been before the jury, even if counsel had performed as defendant now says he should 
have. 
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Defendant's minor contentions do not undermine that conclusion. First, despite 
defendant's suggestion otherwise, see Aplt. Br. at 27, Fred Orton never seriously disputed 
that the attack took place on defendant's property. See R. 314:47-49. Second, although 
no rock with blood or hair was found at the scene to corroborate Orton's testimony, see 
Aplt. Br. at 27, defendant, who did not even realize he had a broken wrist at the time, 
could have easily removed the rock from the area. Third, although a wrench was found 
on the front seat of Orton's truck, see Aplt. Br. at 27, two other tools were on top of the 
wrench when police observed the truck shortly after the attack, see R. 314:60, implying 
that the wrench had not been the last tool used. Finally, although several people testified 
that Orton often neglected his cattle and one testified that he and Orton had gotten into a 
fight before, see Aplt. Br. at 27, several people also testified for the State concerning 
defendant's temper even though defendant himself claimed never to have been in a 
confrontation in Iron County before, and that he was "a lover, not a fighter." R. 314:241, 
257, 264-82. 
Because defendant has not shown '"there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different,'" Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted), 
defendant's ineffective assistance claims fail. 
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III. DEFENDANT'S PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIM FAILS 
WHERE THE PROSECUTOR REVEALED THE SOURCE OF DR. 
DELCORE'S LETTER BEFORE IT WAS ADMITTED 
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct because "Dr. 
Delcore's statement constituted inadmissible hearsay, and was therefore inappropriately 
brought before the jury." Aplt. Br. at 41. Alternatively, defendant claims the prosecutor 
committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose "that the Iron County 
Prosecutor, Scott Burns, was the author of the Delcore document, and that he and Dr. 
Delcore are 'best friends.'" Aplt. Br. at 40. "Because the true origin of Dr. Delcore's 
statement and his relationship to Mr. Burns were not properly disclosed," defendant 
argues, the prosecutor's actions constituted a "fabrication of evidence" and a "fraud on 
the court." Aplt. Br. at 40-41. The record does not support either of defendant's claims. 
To establish prosecutorial misconduct, "'defendant must show that the remarks 
called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
reaching a verdict and, if so, that the remarks were harmful.'" State v. Tuckett, 2000 UT 
App 295, lj 14, 13 P.3d 1060 (citations omitted). "'Because a trial court is in the best 
position to determine an alleged error's impact on the proceedings, [this Court] will not 
reverse a trial court's [ruling] on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of 
discretion.'" State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 10, 69 P.3d 1278 (citation omitted). 
32 
Here, the trial court concluded in denying defendant's post-trial motion: 
the significant point is whether the proffered testimony is stipulated 
to and both sides agree that the proffered testimony be submitted to 
the jury. It doesn't matter who wrote it or who stated it as long as 
the words have been agreed to by both sides. 
R. 314:429; R. 258-59. The court then found—in a finding defendant does not attack on 
appeal as clearly erroneous—that both sides agreed to the words in the letter here. R. 
314:429; R. 258-59. 
Because defense counsel agreed to the language in Dr. Delcore's letter and 
stipulated to the letter's admission, defendant cannot show that the prosecutor improperly 
referred to inadmissible hearsay evidence and thereby "called to the jurors' attention 
matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict.'" Tuckett, 
2000 UT App 295, ^  14. Thus, defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim fails. 
To the extent defendant's claim is that the prosecutor improperly withheld 
evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), defendant provides no legal 
authority to support a Brady claim. See Aplt. Br. at 40-42. Consequently, this Court 
should reject the claim as inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)\State v. 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99,1j 46 n.5, 37 P.3d 1073; State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 
1998); State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ 20, 63 P.3d 72; State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 
(Utah App. 1990). 
33 
In any case, defendant's claim is not supported by the record. Specifically, 
defendant claims that "[a]t the hearing on Mr. Heil's Motion for New Trial, the trial court 
first learned that the Iron County Prosecutor, Scott Burns, was the author of the Delcore 
document, and that he and Dr. Delcore are 'best friends.'" Aplt. Br. at 40. On the 
contrary, in denying defendant's motion, the trial court found that the origin of the letter 
had been disclosed to both counsel and the court at trial. R. 258-60. Defendant does not 
attack this finding as clearly erroneous. See Aplt. Br. at 40-42. Thus, contrary to 
defendant's claims, there was no "fabrication of evidence" or "fraud on the court." Aplt. 
Br. at 41. 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 7A April 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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(May 3, 2002) 
(Court called to order.) 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Let me read into the record, I 
wrote some notes last night after I got a, kind of a panic 
call from Dr. Delcore at 3:30. He was very dis^b^ayght. He 
said, you can't do this to me, Judge. And I said well-, what 
am I doing to you? And he said, I have long-standing 
surgeries set for tomorrow beginning at 6:00 a.m., some can't 
wait. Three of them I think he said would have physical 
pain or, OR problems that needed to be addressed with surgery 
right now. He said he was served with a subpoena just 
yesterday. I told him it was totally improper if that was 
true because this case has been, has been set for some 
time. He said he would be done at 4:00 p.m. ojily if every 
single operation goes perfectly. 
I asked him what he would say if he testified and 
maybe it could be handled by A proffer. He said Jeff Heil 
is my patient. And he said that the patient reported being 
hit by a wrench so that's what he wrote down in the patient's 
file. Said he doesn't know how the jury occurred. The 
jury is a scaphoid fracture which could be caused by hitting, 
by being hit by something, but more likely from falling down 
or even throwing a punch. The injury comes from the wrist 
being bent backwards like starting a motorcycle. I assume 




























it's this kind of motion. Resulting hyperextending 
something. I couldn't read my notes, I guess, I think maybe 
it was a ligament. 
I looked for Mr. Dent's phone number in the 
phonebook while he was still on the line, I only could see an 
office number. So I said, you go do the surgeries at 
6:00 a.m., the most we will do is call you between surgeries 
so the attorneys can verify that what I wrote down is 
correct. 
So that's what I did spur of the moment. I 
couldn't see in if fact he was only served a day earlier. 
And you can double-check that. 
MR. DENT: He was served on the 30th of April, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: A Tuesday for a Friday appearance? 
MR. DENT: Tuesday. 
THE JUDGE: Well, but why so late? This has been 
set for a long time. 
MR. DENT: We weren't sure exactly, Your Honor, 
who our witnesses were going to be, we— 
THE JUDGE: Well, but he saw him just a couple of 
days after this incident last summer. 
MR. DENT: Well, I think that Mr. Heil had spoken 
to a, to Dr. Delcore on the phone and they had talked. And I 
had made efforts to talk to Dr. Delcore myself. And I did 
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that other matter? 
MR. DENT: May we, Your Honor? 
(Tape turned off.). 
(In chambers on speaker phone). 
THE JUDGE: Let me turn it on. Are you still 
there, Dr. Delcore? 
THE WITNESS: I am. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Let me just say for the 
record, this is Judge Braithwaite. I'm in chambers. I don't 
have either attorney available and so I'm speaking with Mr., 
or Dr. Delcore on the speaker phone. 
If you were called and asked what caused the 
accident, I mean, what caused the injury in whatever terms 
you want to use what would you say? 
DR. DELCORE: In my opinion a, with regard to the 
injury sustained to Mr. Heil's wrist a, his injury is a 
scaphoid fracture. There is a little a, there i s — 
THE JUDGE: Come in. Sorry. Go ahead. 
(Attorneys entered chambers). 
DR. DELCORE: Sure. The mechanism of a scaphoid 
fracture is well understood, there's been wealth of 
biomechanical data done on live (short inaudible, no mic) 
specimens, testing and, and thoroughly testing and 
understanding the mechanism of injuries for scaphoid 
fractures, as a vast wealth of, of basic scientific data 




























states that the scaphoid really fails, it really fractures 
in almost only one mechanism and that is with a hyperdorsal 
flexion injury of the wrist, meaning the wrist is bent 
backwards forcibly either, for example, from a fall on an 
outstretched hand or a, a car crank, engine crank backfiring 
and, you know, jerking the wrist back forcibly, or any other 
mechanism somebody might want to a, think about which would 
cause a wrist to be forced backwards a, in a violent 
manner. That is really the only way the scaphoid can fail 
and fracture. 
And to contrast that with a, the report of Jeff 
that a, he may have sustained that injury from being struck 
a, by a, a monkey wrench or a pipe or something. Well a, 
clearly in medicine we leave, you know, any option a, open 
just because that's the way we approach our profession. 
It is extremely unlikely if not almost impossible 
to, to fracture a scaphoid with a concussion or a contusion 
mechanism injury. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. The attorneys joined me midway 
through that. I'm going to let them... You're not under 
oath or anything but I'm sure you'll give an honest answer. 
DR. DELCORE: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Let me ask if they have any questions 
that they would like to ask you. 
Mr. Garrett? 
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MR. GARRETT: Well, he said... My question there 
was the likelihood of a wrench hitting the wrist causing 
that kind of a fracture. And you said that it was almost 
nothing. 
DR. DELCORE: Extremely unlikely if not impossible. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Dent, would you like to 
ask Dr. Delcore any questions? 
MR. DENT: Doctor, a, Jeff was under the 
impression that you had told him earlier that it was" quite 
likely that was' caused by a blow to the wrist and m'ay have 
been exacerbated by a, a backward flex. 
DR. DELCORE: My understanding, from my 
understanding, not my understanding, my recollection was a, 
on the first visit where Mr. Heil may be, you know, recalling 
this, when he first came to my clinic in the midst of 
obtaining an history he a, posed a question that seemed a 
little a, awkward a, because usually when people present a, 
with an injury there is no question, they know exactly what 
happened and it's not a matter of a, could this have possibly 
(inaudible word). 
My recollection is that he did ask me is it 
possible, quote, is it possible that this could have been 
fractured by being struck by a, a monkey wrench or pipe or 
something like that. And you know, I, I looked up in the 
air and I said well, you know, anything is possible but it's 




























extremely unlikely. He says well, it's possible that, that 
it cracked it. 
Because here's the, here's the issue. With a 
concussion injury or, you know, or something that strikes the 
wrist in the back, that one it's not where the scaphoid is, 
two, there was no bruising and no, no sign of soft tissue 
trauma in that area to, to kind of concur with, with what he 
was proposing that might have happened. And, and three, it 
would, it would, if it were to it would create only a, a 
crack or would liked create a, at the very remotest 
possibility it would only create a little crack or a dent in 
whatever bone it struck, but it would not create a displaced 
fracture. And Mr. Heil's injury was a displaced scaphoid 
fracture. 
So then he kept on and said well, is it possible 
that it might have cracked and then with the, you know, 
subsequent altercation it a, you know, may have been then 
displaced from, you know, whailing on him or punching him and 
stuff. And I said well that's, that's possible, maybe you 
could have cracked it and, and then it displaced further when 
you punched. 
But the real question is is that likely. And, 
and being struck on the back of the wrist a, is just not a, 
a typical mechanism of injury for a scaphoid fracture and 
it would just be just unlikely. 




























He said is it possible. In medicine we say 
anything is possible. But it's not likely. 
MR. DENT: So a, I don't mean to be redundant, but 
is it possible that a blow to the wrist with a cresent wrench 
a, could have caused some initial trauma that was exacerbated 
by punching? 
DR. DELCORE: I was, I have to say, just because 
that's we do in medicine leave any, anything open to the 
realm of possibility. But it's extremely unlikely. 
MR. GARRETT: Dr. Delcore you stated that there 
were, there was no laceration or bruising, contusion on the 
arm? 
DR. DELCORE: Right. And that's probably why I, 
I maintain a, the opinion that it's probably unlikely, you 
know, extremely unlikely. Because I, I could not 
corroborate a, his physical exam to say that this is where a 
monkey wrench or whatever it was hit him. You know, if it 
hit him with that degree then you'd expect at least the, you 
know, a bruise or some scraping or something on the back of 
where he said he was hit on the back of his wrist. 
Even though I still understand, that you have to 
understand the scaphoid is not in the back of the wrist. 
MR. GARRETT: But you would have expected some 
contusions, some lacerations, something from being hit with 
that kind of force by a wrench? 




























DR. DELCORE: Correct. 
MR. GARRETT: All right. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you very much. I think 
we'll work around you and not call you back. And I 
apologize and I appreciate— 
DR. DELCORE: No. I apologize. I feel like, you 
know, you're doing me a great favor by allowing me to not 
interrupt the surgery day. And I just feel bad that I didn't 
have more time to get a, my schedule changed. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
DR. DELCORE: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Bye. 
THE JUDGE: Bye. 
(Tape turned off). 
THE BAILIFF: Shall I bring the jury in or not? 
THE JUDGE: I think we're ready for the jury 
aren't we? 
MR. DENT: We are, Your Honor. 
MR. GARRETT: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. How do you want to address 
what we just resolved? One of you read it, just publish 
it, have the clerk read it, or what? I'm, I'm not going to 
read it. 
MR. GARRETT: Yes. I think it would be fine to 
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letter of his. It' s not signed. Y .';! be given a copy 
the cltih, ui ± wil] She'll just lead whac he's got. 
THE CLERK: "Statement of Randy G. 
Delcore. My name io i.^ ndy G. Delcore. 
I!m a n orthopedic surgeon, And on or 
a b o u t A i i g i i s t: 2 611: i, 2 0 0 Il '. . - o c - • d J e f f r e y 
Heil for an injury to hi.s right scaphoid 
body. 
Mr 'T-J' ^~-r<orted +' rr i 4"hat ho 
received cms ^njuiy by oeing struck vviln 
"-- -.rench bv another person - I though 
like anything is possible, . n I:IV opinion 
striking another person With h\s right 
hand causing the wrist-hand to rotate 
backwards un^ cnus causing an injury, not 
blunt: force trauma from a wrench or other 
• .i I :i tl: lat tl lex: e was i i : 
laceration or bruising on the wrist.'1. 
THE J [ JDGE: D : \ : i I x ic : .t i L = I: : : : E -c :i \ ?1 .) I: I = ;' s i ic: -t 
here today? 
MR. GARRETT: No, that", s 




























THE JUDGE: Okay. I'm glad you brought that 
up. 
There is some blue ink writing on there. I wrote 
it on there after we talked to him. And both attorneys have 
seen it so it's not something that we're slipping by 
anybody. 
MR. GARRETT: And Your Honor, I'll move that that 
be admitted and made a part of the, the evidence. 
THE JUDGE: And that's received by stipulation. 
And all we're waiting for then is the, is the jury 
instructions. 
(Short inaudible discussion with clerk). 
THE JUDGE: Have you got them in order? 
Okay. I'm going to read now instructions 10 
through 25. 
"#10. Testimony of the defendant. 
The defendant is a competent witness in 
his own behalf and his testimony should 
be given the same consideration as you 
give to any other witness, and you may 
test the defendant's credibility or the 
weight of his testimony as you would that 
of other witnesses as given to you before 
in these instructions. 
11. Act and intent. In every crime 
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'I'HE JUDGE: Mate versus Jeffrey Heil. 
strangely. And I see some subpoenas for jurors which is 
-•p: ; •' •• ~nd l'i i: i 1 ir ^  • : f and confused by a 
subpoena for Dr. Delcore. Do we have subpoenaed witnesses, 
urors in this case? 
MR. JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: And upon what authority do you claim to 
1 1 lido 
12 J MR. JACKSON: Well, I :cn' t know a law that 
iiiL JUDGE: , i don't know of any law that 
i kiilows you to. It seems to rr.c 1M:^ vo-j ' r? trv.ing to retry 
1
 : j this case with the jurors and .^;__,..g LIIJI^ L U C A .:;; ;^re. 
1 MR. JACKSON: is the Court not allowing us to 
1 Q 11 subpoer ia \ i 'ji-^oes .
 t; - -"' 
19 ,: THE JUDG1 asking you for authority. On v;h.-;t 
2 ' ' • 3 s i s d • :> } • • : I I c ] a :ii i in ] :: i i :: a i l :i o 11: i a t ? 





witness that we choose to prove rAur case, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: . ,jic ,,. _> U lat you just feel line 
you can do it, is what- w rounds like. 
T "ill !" . J / V L J V I I 11 t i e s o n i c Li i i n i | I I I 




























THE JUDGE: Rule 606 talks about affidavits of 
jurors where there's been an inappropriate contact with the 
jurors. But we don't have that in this case. Whatever 
mistakes may have been made were done with the, with the 
recordings going and everything occurring that I'm aware of. 
I talk with counsel in chambers, we videotape it, I make 
decisions, and I rule from the bench. 
Seems to me like defense counsel, both of you, are 
treading on thin ice here as to whether, whether you've acted 
inappropriately or not. 
MR. JACKSON: Well, we ought to have a finding 
established to that effect, Your Honor, so that we have 
something to take up on appeal. If the Court wants to make a 
finding that we've acted inappropriately— 
THE JUDGE; I, I won't know that until we've 
finished the hearing here. But it's extremely unusual. I've 
never seen this attempted or heard of it in 15 years on the 
bunch. 
MR. JACKSON: Well I'm just, you know, we, we 
intend to call jurors to establish a point about their 
reliance on certain evidence. The Court can determine 
whether or not it wants to give any weight or authority to 
that. But I don't see any reason why we should be prohibited 
from being able to subpoena witnesses to attempt to try to 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
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establish 01 ir position. 
TI IE J ( JDGE: 0] ,<: .] • I laving cited no authority to 
take this unusual step, having no affidavits that allege that 
i e i: 3 \ / a s a i i :i w;
 LJ p : , ; . . F o i: e x a i i: i p 1 e , \ 11 I • 31: e I 1 i a • 3 
seen this is where there's contact at lunch, a — 
•- ""K^ON: I t l i:i i ill :: t:l i- = i: e :i s sc i i i 3 ai zthor :i t/5 «;r c 1 1 
that, Your Honor. If I might have a moment. 
r
™ ^ JUDGE: 0] vay. 
,r. K . . . m a y d 11 o c u the Jourl 3 a c z e ri L 1 ^  n 
nay have just a moment here, Your Honor. 
: ; ! ) • • 
This is what. going to do on this issue 
. can suuw me ihai : ' -:i wrori ! . -;oing :o quash the 
c
':bpoenas for anv ^jrors to testify today. I don't think 
, .^re's any precedent or, or a^wvvance in the law for that 
under the facts of this case. So any iurors that were 
-.Op'-jC-li.i-- r. .
 t 1 i r\n 
more subpoenas are to be issued on this until the Court has 
" ! ----- ' ' l • - : ••-.-! '••'- ' , • •'• ,;•:
 : v r i--• t. e . 
MR. JACKSON: That's as to the issue of the 
Jjurors? 
ri'j-ii:J J U D G E : /\J LO jurors being subpoenaed to 
testify •'-v *« -! proceeding post-trial regarding their 
: :-:i^' JLMUSC 1 .. ^  strikes at tiie very 



























foundation of a jury trial being fair and impartial, and then 
it's over and then you don't retry the case with the jurors 
saying well if you'd known this, what about this evidence, 
what about that evidence. It would be a never ending 
potential for a trial after trial. Because then the state 
could counter what about if you knew this or what about if we 
gave you this type of an argument. It stops the finality of 
the, of the jury's decision. 
If you research that and find that I'm wrong and 
that there is a, an ability to do that then I'll readdress it, 
and then if you can convince me then I'll allow subpoenas to 
be issued. But for today there has been no authority shown 
me that would allow that. I think the burden is on the 
defense to show that they have a right to do that. 
MR. JACKSON: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: So, anybody here under subpoena is free 
to go. And we can address the rest of the motion for a new 
trial. 
MR. JACKSON: That only leaves one other witness, 
Your Honor, and that is Dr. Delcore. 
THE JUDGE: Oh, yes. I think that does the same 
thing, doesn't it? Is he here? 
MR. JACKSON: He's not here but he was served with 
a subpoena. 
MR. EMERSON: Your Honor, Greg Emerson on behalf of 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
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.- . : I '"' n: t sorry . 
"I . Y, es. 
3 MR. EMERSON: May I be heard just briefly, 
4 • ' - • ? 
5 THE JUDGE: Go ahead. 
6 M R . EMERSON": - > ".^f uuSt -+- f V^ cut s e t I'll 
" i t : ] ] ;  • : "i i I '"' " i : : t I '"' n not caking issue wi un L : oa .jurt s 
8 te n t a t i v p r u l i n g , ox ruli ng i f that's what it was.' But just 
9 " - - o i i i e :i d e a a s t :: 1 I : i; I 1:1 i :i s c a i i i e a b o u t. 
10 There is, us I'm sure the Court is aware, a couple, 
II! I L L • * r*v*a ' 
II2 i n oxder to get a ma Lion or justify Lne granuing of a motion 
13 for a r^-v.? 'rrirnl. ("no o^ thos^ orongs deals with the 
1 A
 "reasonable likelihood of a favorable outcome and that kind 
'^f h > s i n with the materiality issue as to whether ox not 
j i nater ial. 
THE JUDGE: You're arguing the De1core point, tha t 
MR. EMERSON: X I = J ] tl lat, Delcore as well as, as 
~
)M
 •''•-• l as the jurors, Yoi ir Honor, to testify if j s there is an;; • 
question as to tl le materiality of the Delcore letter and how 
22 jl it was presented io the jur*. : -.r. i.as the thinking behind 
23 :'- i'M oi r:. ,.;-,:-, .-O^ j I KJ j S tl IBX 5 
2 4 • i s no authority for t h a t. B u t i t c ertainly wasn" t:, Y :) i i r 
2 5 -: I o i: , :i i 1 a i 1 e f f o i I: t :: i: e 1 i t :i g a I: = > %- : i: t :: 



























new facts forward. 
THE JUDGE: But that's the end result though, and 
I've ruled the way I have. Usually once I rule you can't 
bring it back up. And frankly, I'd probably snap at 
attorneys if they do bring it back up. I'm specifically 
allowing you to bring this back up if you find some, some 
authority to allow for this unusual procedure. 
MR. EMERSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Let's move to your motion for new 
trial. It's your motion so I'll allow you to go first on 
it. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. EMERSON 
MR. EMERSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
The, the arguments on behalf of, of Mr. Heil are, 
are I believe set forth in, in the motion for a new trial and 
the, and the points of authorities. However, I would just 
like, Your Honor, to point out a couple of what I think are 
key points. 
The State versus Cummings says, sets forth again 
that two prong test that I just mentioned. And the first is 
that it has to be, there has to be some evidence that the jury 
was presented with or was, was allowed to consider that they 
were not justified in considering. The second prong is that 
there was a reasonable likelihood of a favorable outcome had 
the jury not considered that evidence which they were not 



























justified in considering. 
There is in this case the Delcore letter. I have, 
Your Honor, on numerous occasions reviewed the, the videotaped 
proceedings including in chamber conferences between, between 
counsel. And there is one in chambers conference between 
counsel that, that did address the Delcore issue when 
Mr. Delcore was on the phone via conference and a, Mr. Garrett 
and Mr., Mr. Dent were, were also present. 
I, I failed to see at any point in the entire 
taping, videotaping of the proceedings in the Heil matter 
where the jury was advised that this was a letter that was 
written by the county attorney's office. 
And in fact, you know, there is, there is a 
procedure, and I'm sure I'm not telling the Court anything it 
doesn't already know, but if someone, if a witness is not 
available to testify and there's a stipulated statement then 
it's usually presented to the jury in the manner of this 
witness is unable to testify, however, if they were called to 
testify both parties have stipulated that this would be their 
testimony. There's some kind of a, a precursor to the 
reading of that statement generally by a, by the court clerk 
as has been my experience. But that, that statement is then 
read to the, read to the jury. 
In this case it was presented to the jury as if it 
were indeed a letter from Dr. Delcore, which it was not. It 



























was presented to the jury, it was presented to the jury as if 
Dr. Delcore had written the letter and sent it to the, to the 
county attorney's office or to the court. 
And clearly... And again, I understand that the 
Court isn't a, for the reasons stated going to allow jurors to 
testify. But it's our understanding that, that that letter 
was, was critical in, in the decision made by the jury to 
convict Mr. Heil of second degree felony assault. 
I believe, and I, I want to point out to the 
Court where I believe what the materiality of it is and 
why— 
THE JUDGE: If you wonder what I'm doing, I'm 
searching for the letter. 
MR. EMERSON: Oh, I'm fine. 
THE JUDGE: I am listening but that's what I'm 
after. Do you have a copy of that? 
MR. EMERSON: We do, Your Honor. 
(Inaudible discussion at counsel table.) 
THE JUDGE: Oh, here. I've got it. 
MR. EMERSON: The letter, Your Honor, is, it begins 
you know, I am Dr. Delcore, I am Randy Delcore. I don't know 
the, I don't recall the exact language but— 
THE JUDGE: You're right. My name is Randy G. 
Delcore. 
MR. EMERSON: As if it, as if it is indeed a letter 


























from Dr. Delcore. First of all, the jury is not justified in 
receiving into evidence and considering in its deliberations 
something that purports to be what it is not. It purports to 
be a letter from Dr. Delcore. It is not a letter from 
Dr. Delcore. It's... 
Whether he would have testified consistent with a 
letter or statement or whatever we're calling it is not, 
that's not at issue. He didn't testify, he was not placed 
under oath, he was not cross examined. The jury did not have 
an opportunity to assess Dr. Delcore's credibility on the 
stand under oath. 
And I will, I will point out as well, Your Honor, 
that the, the conference call that I, that I observed on 
videotape in chambers, Dr. Delcore was not placed under oath 
at that time either. 
THE JUDGE: No. 
MR. EMERSON: S o — 
THE JUDGE: At least my memory is that he wasn't. 
MR. EMERSON: So the statement or letter or 
whatever we're calling it that was presented to the jury is 
not a statement that was given under oath at any time. So 
for those reasons I, I do believe that the jury was not 
justified in considering this piece of evidence. If it had 
come in through another, through another process, either live 
testimony from him or a stipulated statement, again consistent 



























with what I, with what I described a few minutes ago as to 
he's not here and the parties have agreed that this is what 
he would say, that's a different issue. But, but we don't 
have that issue. What we have is something that purports 
to be a letter written authored or drafted by Dr. Delcore. 
And it was not either drafted by Dr. Delcore nor a letter 
from him. The jury clearly was not justified in considering 
that. 
The second, the second issue then in, in Cummings, 
the second prong then is, had we not had that, it's a harmless 
error analysis really, had we not had that is there a 
reasonable likelihood... We don't have to be, we don't have 
to be certain that, that things would have been different, 
just a reasonable likelihood. 
Well that letter, Your Honor, attacks... I think it 
was, it was well crafted by the prosecution. It attacks an 
essential element of the affirmative defense. The whole 
issue here wasn't, wasn't whether or not there was an 
altercation between, between Mr. Orton and Mr. Heil. The 
question was, was Mr. Heil's actions appropriate and were they 
responsive to a perceived threat. That's, that's the, that 
was the whole issue before the jury as I see it on a 
self-defense theory, was Mr. Heil's actions consistent with 
someone acting in self-defense. That purported letter 
attacks that issue directly by saying in essence I don't 



























believe Mr. Heil's version that he was struck with a, with a 
wrench. Well, that was Mr. Heil's affirmative defense is 
that he responded to that attack from the, from the wrench by 
Mr. Orton. 
Well you now have, you now have an essential element 
of the affirmative defense being attacked, Mr. Heil's 
credibility being attacked by someone that was presented to 
the jury initially by Mr. Dent as being Mr. Heil's defense 
witness. So now you have, you have a situation where you 
have no, he's not under oath, it's not a letter drafted by 
him, it's not even a letter. And now it's an attack, it's 
attacking an essential element of an affirmative defense. 
And it's also doing it in a, in a way that ridicules Mr., 
Mr. Heil by saying, you know, there's a statement in there 
well I guess any, in this world anything is possible or 
something to that effect. You know, which is, which is 
clearly ridiculing Mr. Heil's version of events. 
Well, that was the whole issue before the jury. 
Not whether or not there was an altercation, whether or not 
Mr. Heil's actions were responsive to a threat made by 
Mr. Orton. That piece of purported evidence hits right to 
the heart of that issue. 
Had that, had that letter... And again I, I 
understand that the Court, I understand the Court's position 
with regards to the, to the subpoenas and, you know, there is 



























an affidavit attached Eloise Stocks (phonetic), and I 
understand that the, I don't know how the Court is going to 
feel about that but perhaps that goes with the subpoenas 
but— 
THE JUDGE: I, I think that goes with the 
subpoenas. This is a small town. That Clair Stocks's 
wife? 
MR. JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Who is Mr. Jackson's father's best 
friend. So we've got everybody. Scott Burns says he best 
friends with Randy Delcore. It's kind of a mess that way. 
But anyway, go ahead. 
MR. EMERSON: I, I understand. 
The, I mean, the issue here as far as the, as far as 
the Delcore letter appears to be, to be fairly simple. 
Your Honor, there's, there's a phrase that, that's 
used by, by those of us on the defense side I think, or at 
least in my experience, quite often when we're, we're pleading 
with the Court for some kind of an allowance or something, and 
we say in the interest of justice thinking that, that to take 
the high road and to kind of, you know, work on, on Your Honor 
in that way is effective. 
But in this case I really do think that the interest 
of justice requires that there be a new trial. The interest 
of justice requires that if there is a question that is this 



























significant, that addresses the very heart of the defense's 
theory, and it's really decided or appears to be decided 
conclusively by the jury based on something that was not 
justifiably put before them, neither a letter, not under 
oath. It just, in the interest of justice there has to be a 
new trial. It just does not appear to me that the Court can 
look and say well, you know, there's ample evidence. 
Well, there's ample evidence of an altercation, 
that's correct. There's ample evidence that there were 
injuries sustained by Mr. Orton. That is absolutely 
undeniable. Those, those... But that's not the issue. The 
issue is the self-defense. That purported letter attacks 
that. 
The, the opposition by the prosecution states, 
really, it really addresses the in chambers issues with the 
Delcore letter and not, not whether or not they were justified 
in presenting that to the jury. Well, quite frankly I don't 
see anywhere, I mean, I don't see some of the things that are, 
that are, that are presented in the opposition. I don't, I 
didn't see those things happening in chambers like a 
stipulation or a discussion of necessarily of what a, how that 
letter came, letter came about. 
One thing in the opposition that did kind of strike 
me as being unusual is there was the statement in the 
opposition that said that they were anticipating that 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 


























Dr. Delcore would not show up. How they had advance notice 
of that and how they had time to prepare that, that purported 
letter from Dr. Delcore I think is, I don't know the answer to 
that, Your Honor, but I do think it's something that should 
be, that raises an eyebrow. Why is it that the prosecution 
had advance notice that Dr. Delcore wasn't going to go and the 
defense did not? Why did they have such advance notice that 
they had the opportunity to draft this statement, and the 
defense did not? 
And the, the opposition states that, that Mr. Dent 
was advised beforehand that this letter wasn't written by 
Dr. Delcore but was in fact written by Scott Burns. Nothing 
on the videotape or the official record as I see it, nothing 
in there suggests that that was the case. If that was 
something that occurred in the hallway I don't know. I have, 
I have no way of knowing that. But the record is what the 
record is and the record does not reflect that there was, that 
there was a disclosure in any kind of detail whatsoever as to 
the origin of that letter. 
And I do think that the Court, I do think that the 
Court should consider that, not just how it was presented to 
the jury but how this, how the whole letter came about and how 
the prosecution was able to anticipate and, and draft that 
letter and, and the defense had no knowledge of it until such 
time as Dr. Delcore was on the phone on the conference call in 




























The, the second issue is ineffective assistant of 
counsel. That's never, Your Honor, at least from my personal 
point of view, an easy thing for an attorney to, you know, to 
raise against another member of the Bar. However, had there 
actually been a disclosure to Mr. Dent by the prosecution that 
this letter was indeed not a letter, and it was not drafted by 
Dr. Delcore but rather it was drafted by, by Scott Burns or 
something from the county attorney's office, had that 
admission or disclosure been made to Mr. Dent, Mr. Dent 
clearly, clearly had an obligation, a reasonable common sense 
obligation to say wait a minute, I'm not going to allow a 
critical piece of evidence, which isn't evidence, which is 
manufactured by someone other than who it purports to be 
drafted by, to go before the jury that, that directly attacks 
an essential element of our affirmative defense. 
It's, it's one way or the other. It was either 
inappropriate to present it to the jury and it was 
prosecutorial misconduct by not disclosing it, or if it was 
disclosed it was Mr. Dent's ineffectiveness that allowed it 
to be presented to the jury in the form that it was. 
But in either sense, Your Honor, and it doesn't 
really matter, it doesn't really matter which one it is. 
What matters is the jury got ahold of a piece of, of a piece 
of paper that was not what it was purported to be, should not 



























have been given to them, and was absolutely critical, it 
appears, in their decision to convict Mr. Heil. 
Mr. Heil is the last person of all the players in 
that game, the last person who should suffer the consequences 
of either inappropriate behavior or failure to act 
appropriately on the part of Mr. Dent. 
So any way you look at it it should not have been 
presented and it does, it is, it does form the basis, 
justifiable basis for granting a motion for a new trial. 
The third, the third issue, Your Honor, is whether 
or not pursuant, pursuant to the a, to the code there was 
evidence that this whole issue on the a, the class A 
misdemeanor versus second degree or third degree felony 
assault, whether or not there was substantial evidence or, or 
substantial injury or serious injury as defined— 
THE JUDGE: This strikes me as having absolutely no 
merit whatsoever. But go ahead and attack it. I saw the 
photos at the prelim, I heard the testimony. It was an 
extremely serious injury to him. How this, how this drops 
down to a misdemeanor level is beyond me. Please explain to 
me how this broken jaw and... 
Anyway, go ahead. Have you looked at the 
pictures? 
MR. EMERSON: I have, Your Honor. It's a, it's 
going to be a challenge but I'll try to explain it. 



























THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. EMERSON: The... There is, there is no 
question but that, and, and I'm using layman's terms here as I 
believe Mr. Dent did in, in his opening statement, as a layman 
would use the term, there was serious injury. There's no 
question about that. 
If I were in Mr. Orton's position and I suffered a, 
half of the injuries that he suffered as a result of that 
there's no question that I would say that those were serious 
injuries. So I agree with the Court in that sense. The 
pictures, they certainly evidence, they certainly evidence 
injury, serious injury in layman's terms. 
But I think that the code makes a distinction 
between serious and substantial. And I believe that if 
anybody, if any one of us in common conversation, not as 
attorneys or as a judge, but just as, you know, two 
individuals, I think we would call what the code calls 
substantial we would call serious in that context. 
But I think there is a distinction for a reason and 
it is not a distinction without a difference. I believe that 
the evidence that's presented to the jury when you're talking 
about that technical distinction, and it's, again it's, it's 
there for a reason. I think that the evidence has to be clear 
to the jury that it is, that it falls within the definition in 
the code of serious as opposed to substantial. 



























Again understanding, I understand what the Court 
is saying, I understand the Court's position. It was a 
serious injury. But there wasn't evidence presented to the 
jury as far as I could tell on the tape, Your Honor, that, 
clear evidence as far as I could tell, that it fit the 
definition of the code as to serious injury, that it appeared 
to be more, a substantial injury. I don't want to waste the 
Court's time with, with that point. I believe I've made that 
point. 
But for those reasons, Your Honor, as best I can, I 
believe that for those reasons, Your Honor, that the Court 
should grant the defense motion for a new trial, that there is 
substantial justification for doing so, and it is in my 
opinion, Your Honor, essential to the interest of justice that 
Mr. Heil be given a fair trial, again, and one that does not 
have the issues, the prejudicial issues that are raised by, by 
the Delcore letter. 
And with that I'll submit it, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: The state's position? 
Let me just say too, I was not happy with the way 
this case was delivered to me basically starting from before 
it tried. And I disclosed this before the trial started and I 
disclosed this to both counsel. I mean, I get a panic letter, 
or not letter, a panic call from Dr. Delcore the night before 
saying why are you, literally, Judge, why are you doing this 



























to me, I've got, I forget what the figure was, 10, 11, 12 
patients undergoing surgery tomorrow. I just got served, I 
can't, I can't do this and continue my surgeries. Yes, I 
can on some of them, but others are in pain. If I have to 
reschedule them for a week later there are going to be people 
with broken bones with excruciating pain for another week, or 
whatever the time period was, until he could get another 
surgery day scheduled. 
And so I had to scramble with the, with the hand 
that I was dealt. And I told him no, I'm not going to put 
people through physical pain and suffering because somebody 
wasn't subpoenaed on time or... 
And I don't know. Maybe, maybe Mr. Heil presented 
this to Mr. Dent as somebody to be subpoenaed because 
absolutely he's going to be, Dr. Delcore is going to be in his 
court. 
Anyway, I was given that. And we started with the 
trial, I disclosed what had happened, I made rulings as I did, 
right or wrong. But I think I made a record all the way 
through, and that record can go up on appeal. 
But it's your chance to respond and, and go ahead, 
Mr. Garrett. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. GARRETT 
MR. GARRETT: Well first, Judge, defense counsel 
makes some strong allegations I think against both the bench 



























and myself. Particularly in light of the fact that he wasn't 
here for the trial and, and is not aware of everything that 
went on. You and I were present and, and I believe the state 
made a full and fair disclosure of the origin of that 
letter. 
That letter was prepared the morning of, of the 
second day of trial, I believe, as Dr. Delcore and Scott Burns 
are friends and had a talk about his not being able to get to 
court that day. Scott Burns prepared a letter of the 
statements that Dr. Delcore would make if he were called to, 
to testify. You were well aware of the fact the letter was 
never signed and so was the jury. Dr. Delcore's signature 
was never placed on the, on the letter itself. 
In fact, we had a chance to talk with Dr. Delcore 
over the phone, we verified that the statements in the letter 
were consistent with the statements over the phone. On that 
basis defense counsel, myself and you stipulated that the 
letter should come in representing Dr. Delcore's testimony so 
that he wouldn't have to be present at the trial to testify, 
allowing him to stay in surgery. 
You could have continued the trial possibly to 
the next Monday requiring Dr. Delcore to come and testify 
and then his statements would have been the same as, as what 
was reflected in the letter. That didn't happen. We, we 
proffered the, the testimony to the jury based on the 



























telephone conversation that we had with Dr. Delcore. 
THE JUDGE: I don't think I've got a... What was 
the date of the trial? 
MR. EMERSON: May 3rd, or May 3rd was the 
conviction, Your Honor. I believe it was a two day trial. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. It was a two day trial. I didn't 
have an open day, I didn't have another open two days for a 
while after that and definitely not Monday or Tuesday. 
Anyway, go ahead. 
MR. GARRETT: Anyway, it's the state's position 
that, that we were all satisfied with the contents of the 
letter given the telephone conversation that we had with 
Delcore. 
So basically what, what it comes down to, I'll be 
succinct here, I'll be, I'll be rapid with my arguments. What 
it boils down to is whether or not there was an error that 
existed by allowing that letter to come in. Once you have 
stipulated proffered testimony he has to look at it in terms 
of plain error. And the three criteria are whether an error 
exists, whether the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court, and then the reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable, favorable outcome. 
And I submit, Your Honor, that they cannot prove 
that there is a more reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome because they have shown, they have not been able to 



























they have not made a showing of prejudice. 
And I submit to you there was ample evidence in the 
way of testimony from Fred Orton that if the jury believed it, 
to sustain the verdict. And there, there's no showing that 
they would have been, the outcome would have been different if 
they had not considered the Delcore letter. 
And you've made it clear how you feel about the 
sufficiency of the evidence claim and, and I've briefed it, so 
I'll submit it on the brief. 
THE JUDGE: What about the defense claim that there 
wasn't this, I don't remember, that it wasn't disclosed that 
Scott Burns wrote the letter? 
MR. GARRETT: And my argument is, and I'm going off 
memory, I've seen the tape too and it wasn't, on the record it 
wasn't disclosed. But I distinctly remember you asking 
Mr. Dent whether or not he was a made aware of Scott Burns and 
Randy Delcore's relationship, and he indicated to you in 
chambers that he was. 
THE JUDGE: I wish that the orthopedic surgeon and 
the county attorney weren't best friends. It would help this 
case along. But that's what the situation was. And that 
would help me not have a muddy situation here. But that's 
what the situation was in Cedar City, Utah at that time. 
Friendships exist. 
The Stocks are great people. I didn't mean earlier 



























to imply anything improper. 
MR. JACKSON: No. I know you didn't. That's just 
the way we have it here. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Anyway, go ahead. 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. EMERSON 
MR. EMERSON: Your Honor, just a, just a few points 
in reply. The first is, it appears that the prosecution's 
position is we're going to take cover in this, in this safe 
harbor area, this area that, that precludes us from really 
getting into the minds of the jurors. Because I think if we 
did, Your Honor, they would tell you look, we didn't trust 
either one of them and then when we saw this Delcore letter 
that was it, we said hey, wait a minute— 
THE JUDGE: Well, I'm not going to let you 
subpoena, I'm not going to let you tell me what the jurors, 
were thinking either. 
MR. EMERSON: I understand that, Your Honor. But 
the, but point is that there's not a safe harbor, that there 
isn't a safe harbor that says hey, wait a minute, you can't 
get into deliberations. 
The Court on its own can look at the evidence and 
can say hey, wait a minute, maybe there's ample evidence by, 
by Mr. Orton that there was injury here, maybe there's ample 
evidence of an altercation,, all of that we don't, we do not 
dispute any of that. 
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there was self-defense, that there was justified 
self-defense. 
That's the issue that's attacked by the letter. 
It is material. And they were not justified in hearing it. 
The, you know, this safe harbor idea well hey, wait, 
you can't prove it because you can't get into the minds of the 
jurors. Well, that's blatantly unfair. Because he's right, 
we can't, we're not permitted to do so. 
But the Court can and should look and say well, wait 
a minute, I understand there's ample evidence as to all these 
other factors. But how about as to self-defense? In, in 
what way does this Delcore letter, which we know now is not 
from Delcore nor a letter, in what way does that address that 
issue? Well, it strikes at the heart of it, Your Honor. 
Right at the heart of it. 
And then you've got to look and say okay, well, what 
other evidence is there that would support a finding that 
this, that this use of force... Use of force. I represent 
police officers so I'm used to speaking in those terms. 
But the, the force used by, by Mr. Heil, what 
evidence is there absent the Delcore letter that says look, 
this whole wrench thing is a bunch of balogna, paraphrasing. 
Absent that what evidence is there? There's the statement by 
two individuals, Mr. Heil and Mr. Orton, and that's it. 
There's no witnesses, there's no physical evidence, there's no 



























video camera, there's nothing. 
THE JUDGE: We have that situation in cases every 
day though. For example, a date rape. It's two different 
versions and the jury decides, and we have no tie breaker 
witness. 
MR. EMERSON: I understand, Your Honor. But in 
this case the tie breaker was Mr. Delcore. And it was not 
Mr. Delcore. It was Mr. Scott Burns encloaking himself in 
Mr. Delcore's name and position and relationship. He 
exploited the relationship that, that Mr. Heil had with his 
own doctor. 
And Mr. Dent came up right up front in opening 
statement and said you're going to hear from Dr. Delcore, he's 
the doctor that treated Mr. Heil. That makes this 
particularly, particularly egregious, Your Honor, is that 
Scott Burns put himself in Mr. Delcore!s position and 
testified as if he were Dr. Delcore, and he was not. 
Well these things that, that apparently happened 
outside the record like a disclosure or whatever, none of that 
is on the record. 
Mr. Garrett is right. I was not here. But what I 
do know, Your Honor, is what the Court of Appeals if this 
thing goes any further or what anybody else will know, and 
that's only what's on the record. To say well, well 
Mr. Emerson is wrong because he's only looking at the 



























record, he's not looking at all of this, this peripheral 
stuff, or this stuff that happened on the periphery. 
Well, I don't have to look at that. None of that is on the 
record. 
The record shows very clearly that there was no 
disclosure either to Mr. Dent, to the Court, at least on 
the record, nor to the jury that this was a letter written 
by Scott Burns who happens to be a best friend of 
Dr. Delcore. 
Looking at that, Your Honor, it is muddy waters. 
And can you say look, in a small town, you know, you're going 
to run into these situations where you have friendships and 
people are... And I, and I noticed, Your Honor, and a, I 
mean, I noticed that Your Honor has a, has a particular, in 
doing the a, the voir dire Your Honor really got into those 
issues as to who knew who and what their connections were so I 
see that there's some sensitivity to that. 
THE JUDGE: It's a common problem. 
MR. EMERSON: I could see from the, from the jury 
selection process, Your Honor. 
But the point is that in this case it's particularly 
suspect when the prosecution is contacted prior. The 
prosecution who happens to be, the county attorney happens to 
be a best friend of Dr. Delcore, has the opportunity to put 
whatever he wants to in a letter and can put on Dr. Delcore's 



























name tag and present that to a jury in an inappropriate 
manner. 
It's either inappropriate if it wasn't disclosed or 
it's incompetence on the part of Mr. Dent if it was. Either 
way it's wrong. And Mr. Heil is the one who has suffered and 
he should not suffer, he should not suffer. 
If the evidence is clear, Your Honor, there's no 
harm in having a new trial, bring Dr. Delcore forward, have 
him testify in an appropriate manner that protects the 
process. The process, there has to be some integrity in the 
process. To turn, to turn away and say look, we had some back 
scenes conversations between the attorneys and whatever and, 
you know, trust us, everything is okay here, just trust us. 
That's not acceptable. 
The process has to have some integrity. It doesn't 
if that letter is allowed to stand with this jury, with the 
jury that was here. And if that conviction is allowed to 
stand as is, the process has no integrity. 
The prosecution through Mr. Garrett, or Mr. Burns 
is gone now, but Mr. Garrett or anybody else can manufacture 
evidence or, or create statements in the form, purporting to 
be in the form of a letter and present it to the jury. We 
would never allow that, Your Honor, beforehand, ever. 
The interest of justice, the integrity of the, of 
the process says this is way too close. And if a man is 



























going to be sentenced to jail time we'd better make, we'd 
better make sure that the process was fair. The process has 
to be fair. 
And, Your Honor, if that means that Your Honor has 
to, has to acknowledge look, and I'm not suggesting that this 
is the case, but if it means that Your Honor or Mr. Dent or 
Mr. Garrett or Mr. Burns has to say you know what, we, we 
never intentionally made a mistake, we never did anything 
intentionally to cause any problems here for Mr. Heil. 
However, the process appears shakey. We have to do the right 
thing. And the only right thing in this case is to grant the 
motion for a new trial. And if it turns out again 
Dr. Delcore's testimony is what it is, it is what it is. 
But at that point in time, Your Honor, we'll know 
that there was a fair process and that Mr. Heil had a fair 
opportunity, a fair opportunity to present his case and 
to, and to cross examine those who would testify adverse to 
him. 
Finally, Your Honor, the, the, the issue, the issue 
of the subpoenas. The Court made perfectly clear to Mr. Dent 
that the reason that the Court found itself in the predicament 
that it was, that it found itself in was because Mr. Dent had 
failed to issue the subpoenas with, with, in adequate time and 
he didn't give proper notice. Well, that kind of snowballed 
into what we have today. 



























But again, ray, my point, and I know I've said it a 
number of times, the process lost its integrity somewhere 
along the way regardless of who, of who did it or why they did 
it, or if it was inadvertent, whatever it was. It doesn't 
matter. What matters is there's a person who stands 
convicted because of a letter that was presented to the jury 
that addresses the very heart of his defense. And no one 
stopped it. We don't care whose responsibility it was to 
stop it. It was not stopped, it should have been. 
The motion should be granted for those reasons, Your 
Honor. 
RULING 
THE JUDGE: Let me take these in, in a different 
order. This is the second point that there wasn't sufficient 
evidence to sustain the verdict. I'm denying that. I think 
that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reach the, 
the verdict that they did. They could have gone either way. 
It was their call. They could have found that there wasn't 
serious bodily injury, that there wasn't protracted loss or 
impairment of function of any body member or organ, or they 
could find him guilty. And they went with the guilty and I 
think that there is sufficient evidence to support their 
verdict. So I'm denying that one. 
Then go back to number one. As to the Delcore 
statement, I've already said this isn't the way I like to see 



























cases develop but it's, it's what happened. Dr. Delcore did 
call the night before. 
There was the letter. It was presented to the, to 
the jury as a proffer. We often have proffers submitted to 
juries, either verbal or written. And sometimes if it's 
written it's written by the defense attorney, sometimes it's 
written by the prosecution, sometimes the proffer is verbally 
stated by the defense attorney, sometimes it's by the 
prosecuting attorney. But in either event the significant 
point is whether that proffered testimony is stipulated to and 
both sides agree that the proffered testimony be submitted to 
the jury. It doesn't matter who wrote it or who stated it as 
long as the words have been agreed to by both sides. And they 
were in this case. 
And so I'm denying the motion on that. 
The toughest one for me to decide is the third one 
as to whether or not Mr. Dent's performance was deficient, 
below an objective standard and resulted in prejudice to the 
defendant. 
My feeling at the conclusion of that trial was that 
Mr. Dent did the best he could with the facts that he had and 
the case that was presented to him by the defendant. My 
reading of Mr. Dent was that he was surprised by 
Dr. Delcore's testimony, that it wasn't the same as what the 
defendant had led him to believe. 



























For that matter, and I'll disclose this, when 
Dr. Delcore called me he said well I just write down, when I 
put what happened I write down what my patient tefls me 
happened, I'm not making an independent assessment, I just 
wrote that down. Then went on to say basically what he said 
in his, in this letter. 
It's my reading of Dr. Delcore that he would have 
been a very helpful, well, that his testimony would have 
fallen on the side of assisting the prosecution, would have 
helped their case much more than it would have the defendant, 
and that what was given to the jury in written form was much 
milder, less prejudicial to the defendant than if either side 
had had him on the witness stand that day. 
I have some question about whether his, Mr. Dent's 
performance was deficient in that regard. I can't say that it 
was deficient on his part or if he was misled by his client. 
But either either way I don't think that the defendant was 
prejudiced by Dr. Delcore not testifying, and that Mr. Dent 
not having him subpoenaed earlier than two days prior to the 
trial had a negative impact on the case. If he had him 
subpoenaed a week or two earlier and Dr. Delcore had been here 
I think there's, that just increases the chances of conviction 
because of the reasons I've just stated. It was more of, his 
testimony was more beneficial to the prosecution than to the 
defense. 



























I welcome you to take this up on appeal. I think 
I've made the correct rulings. The record is there. If I 
haven't it will be reversed. 
I've allowed Mr. Heil out on work release after a 
period of no work release. I don't know how close he is to 
completing that but, how far, how close are you, when is 
your... I can't remember when he's out. 
MR. JACKSON: I think he has about another 40 days, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Has he earned some credit for good 
time? 
MR. EMERSON: He has, Your Honor. 
MR. JACKSON: He has. 
MR. EMERSON: Your Honor, based on the, on the 
Court's position we would ask that the Court certified the 
record for appeal and stay the execution of the sentence. 
THE JUDGE: That motion has to be made in writing 
under the rules. You can do and then I'll react once I see 
it. We'll be in recess. 
MR. GARRETT: Thank you, Judge. 
THE JUDGE: The state will prepare the order. 
WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR e^tyc 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH / e* 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY ALAN HEIL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 011500873 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion for a 
New Trial, filed on June 28, 2002. The State of Utah filed an Objection thereto on July 16, 2002. 
Defendant has not replied. 
A hearing on the matter was held on July 25, 2002, Defendant was present and was 
represented by his counsel of record, J. Bryan Jackson and Gregory S. Emerson. The State of 
Utah was represented by Iron County Attorney Scott Garrett. 
Having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties on this issue, having heard the 
parties' arguments and evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court now rules as 
follows: 
BACKGROUND 
This matter arises from a jury trial, which was held on May 2nd, and 3rd, 2002. Defendant 
Jeffrey Alan Heil ("Defendant") was convicted of Aggravated Assault, a second degree felony. 
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Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial in this matter for three (3) different reasons: 
[1] Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial by reason of prosecutorial misconduct 
involving the testimony of Dr. Randy G. Delcore, a Cedar City physician who treated Defendant 
after the altercation giving rise to these charges. 
Dr. Delcore was not subpoenaed until 2 days before trial in this matter, and was scheduled 
to be in surgery all day on the day that his presence was sought. Because of this lack of notice, the 
Court released Dr. Delcore from his subpoena, and instead had his testimony read into the record by 
the clerk. However, the "letter" that the clerk read into the record, and to the jury, was not drafted 
by Dr. Delcore. It had been drafted by Scott M. Burns, the previous Iron County Attorney, and 
prepared for Dr. Delcore's signature. Dr. Delcore, however, had never been able to come sign the 
letter. The origin of the letter was disclosed to the Court and Defense Counsel at that time, Mr. 
Harold Dent, Jr., and the content of the letter had been confirmed with Dr. Delcore via telephone by 
the Court with both attorneys present. In the course of this phone call, the Court even added the 
language "And that there was no laceration or bruising on the wrist," to the letter to make the letter 
more consistent with Dr. Delcore's testimony over the phone. Mr. Dent stipulated to the evidence 
in the letter, and acquiesced in its reading to the jury, as Dr. Delcore was unavailable. 
The fact that the letter was not drafted by Dr. Delcore was not disclosed to the jury, although 
defense counsel and the Court were both aware of its origins. 
[2] Defendant also argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the 
conclusion that Mr. Heil had caused "serious" injury to the victim in this case, and asserts that the 
evidence as presented is only sufficient to support a finding of "substantial" injury, which only 
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supports a Class A Misdemeanor charge, rather that a Second Degree Felony, as Defendant was 
convicted of here. 
[3] Finally, Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on ineffectiveness of his 
trial counsel. Defendant complains that his trial counsel should have kept the letter with Dr. 
Delcore's testimony out of evidence. He also complains of actions or omissions of his counsel at 
trial in that his trial counsel failed to make objections to certain evidence, failed to call witnesses, 
failed to issue subpoenas in a timely manner, and failed to effectively cross-examine witnesses. 
ANALYSIS 
I. THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT INVOLVING THE 
LETTER THAT WAS READ INTO EVIDENCE AS BOTH THE COURT AND 
MR. DENT WERE AWARE OF ITS ORIGIN, AND THE FACTS OF THE 
ORIGIN OF THE LETTER DO NOT NECESSITATE A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant complains of prosecutorial misconduct in that the letter read into evidence as Dr. 
Delcore's, had not actually been written by Dr. Delcore, but had been drafted and prepared for Dr. 
Delcore's signature by former Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns. 
However, the origin of the letter was disclosed to both the Court and to Mr. Dent, and the 
content thereof had been verified by the Court via telephone with both attorneys present and able to 
question Dr. Delcore as to the letter's contents. The letter, and its reading into evidence, were 
stipulated to by Mr. Dent. Defendant complains that Dr. Delcore was not subject to cross-
examination on his testimony, and that the jury was not allowed to hear thgrhe is close friends with 
Scott Burns, the prosecutor and drafter of the letter. 
However, Mr. Dent had stipulated to the reading of the letter into evidence, and made no 
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effort to tell the jury about the origin of the letter, or of the friendship between Dr. Delcore and Scott 
Bums (or to introduce any type of doubt as to the letter's contents therefrom). Therefore, Defendant 
cannot now complain about the introduction of the letter into evidence by its reading, or contend that 
it somehow has improper origins. 
Finally, it is the language of the stipulated document that is important, not the author. 
Proffers are often written (or stated) by the prosecutor, or by the defense. Which person writes (or 
speaks) the proffered testimony is not important. The crucial requirement is that both sides stipulate 
to the proffered testimony - the agreed upon language — as was done in this case . 
Although the jury was unaware that the letter that was read into evidence as Dr. Delcore's 
testimony had not been drafted by Dr. Delcore, there is no indication that the jury's verdict would 
have been any different.1 There was no prosecutorial misconduct involved here because the State 
informed both the Court and Mr. Dent as to the origin of the letter, which was subsequently 
confirmed by the Court and by counsel. 
II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT OF SUSTAIN A 
VERDICT OF GUILTY TO A CHARGE INVOLVING "SERIOUS" BODILY 
INJURY. 
The evidence which was presented at trial was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict to Utah 
Code Ann.§ 76-6-601(10), which involves "serious" bodily injury, as opposed to §76-6-601(11) 
involving "substantial" bodily injury as proposed by Defendant. 
Even if admitting the letter into evidence was in error, it was harmless error. First, had the Court 
compelled Dr. Delcore's presence, the jury would have heard identical testimony to what was stated in the letter. 
Second, the jury had ample evidence to convict Defendant absent the letter containing Dr. Delcore's testimony. 
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Defendant asserts that sufficient evidence to support a finding of "serious" bodily injury was 
not presented to the jury, and that the evidence presented was only sufficient to support a finding of 
a "substantial" injury. 
"In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all the reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^  2 {quoting State v. 
Boyd, 2002 UT 30). As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Layman, 985 P.2d 911 (Utah 
1999), a conviction will only be overturned for insufficient evidence "when it is apparent that there 
is not sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant has committed the crime." Further, as the court 
stated in State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980), "so long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all of the requisite elements of the crime can be 
reasonably made, out inquiry stops." Lamm, at 231. Put another way, the Court will not substitute 
its own judgment for that of the jury as long as there was some evidence which supports their 
decision. 
UCA 76-6-601 defines "Serious Bodily Injury" as "bodily injury that creates or causes 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ, or creates a substantial risk of death." (emphasis added). As the presence of the word "or" 
indicates, this language is phrased to be in the alternative. Evidence of any one of these different 
factors is sufficient to support a finding of "serious" bodily injury. The jury heard the testimony of 
Dr. Pearson that "the fracture [of the victim's jaw] on the right side is not one we can fix," and will 
"never be as good as it was before." 
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This evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of the jury that the victim suffered "protracted 
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ," and is therefore sufficient to 
sustain a guilty verdict to a charge involving "serious" bodily injury.2 The jury also heard the 
testimony of the victim, Fred Orton, that Defendant tackled him from behind; that Defendant hit him 
in the side of the head in "his eye-bone," and then hit him in his jawbone twice, with a rock, and he 
felt it break each time; that he lost track of the blows and lost consciousness; that he thought he was 
going to die ("kiss your ass goodbye," he thought); that when he came to his body had been moved 
to the middle of the road and Defendant then kicked him in the ribs and head, and said "I told you 
Fd kill you" if his cows got in Defendant's hay again; and "I'll beat you to death"; that he "felt his 
brain swelling" and suffered "lots of pain"; that he had surgery requiring a tracheotomy to keep 
breathing; and that he had severe headaches for a month. From all of this the jury could reasonably 
infer that Defendant also created a substantial risk of death. 
III. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT MR. DENT'S PERFORMANCE 
FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD AND THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
PREJUDICED AS A RESULT. 
There is no showing that Defendant was prejudiced in any way by any alleged deficient 
performance of his trial counsel. 
In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim we apply the two-part test of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
To satisfy that test, the defendant must show: "(1) that counsel's performance^was 
deficient below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 
P16, 26 P.3d 203, 414 Utah Adv. Rep. 51. If a defendant fails to establish either of 
In addition, Defendant plays semantics in arguing that the evidence supported "substantial" bodily 
injury, but not "serious" bodily injury. At no point doe9j3efendant differentiate between the two, define either of 
the two, or tell the Court why the injuries suffered by the victim are only "substantial" and not "serious." 
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the two parts of the Strickland test, counsel's assistance was constitutionally 
sufficient, and we need not address the other part of the test. 
State v. Medina-Juarez. 2001 UT 79, 34 P.3d 187. 
In the present case, Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness of counsel fails because he has not 
shown that he was prejudiced by the allegedly deficient performance of his trial counsel. 
Specifically, Defendant has not shown that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome at trial had counsel performed differently. The only piece of "evidence" that Defendant has 
submitted is the improper affidavit by one of the Jurors, discussed in Section I. Aside from the fact 
that such affidavit in not admissible for purposes ,of proving a juror's thought-process, as discussed 
in Section^ the affidavit in question does not insinuate that the result would have been any different 
had the origin been known to the jury. Further, even if Mr. Dent had objected to, and successfully 
kept out the letter which Defendant complains of, the jury still would have had the testimony of the 
victim in this case, as well as Dr. Pearson, which, were overwhelmingly sufficient to convict 
Defendant without the letter. 
Defendant was not prejudiced by Mr. Dent's late service of a subpoena on Dr. Delcore. Had 
Dr. Delcore been present at the trial, or a continued trail, he was adamant that his testimony would 
be along the same lines of what was in the "letter." In fact, the Court notes that Dr. Delcore's 
opinion, which was beneficial to the prosecution, was more forceful when stated verbally, and was 
milder in the letter that was agreed to by the parties. 
Defendant has submitted no other evidence regarding the alleged ineffective assistance of 
Mr. Dent, and submits only bald assertions as to what may have been. Thereby, Defendant has failed 
to show any prejudice suffered by the alleged ineffectiveness of Mr. Dent, and the Court need not 
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examine the specific conduct of which Defendant complains to ascertain whether or not it falls below 
the objective standard of reasonable performance by counsel. 
ORDER 
By reason of the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for New Trial should be, and hereby is 
denied. 
J2. DATED this ^ day of August, 2002. 
ROBERT T. BRXITHWAITE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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